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FORCED SECESSIONS 
JOSEPH BLOCHER* AND MITU GULATI** 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Many of the central challenges in international law arise from bad 
relationships between regions and the nations in which they are located. Some 
scholars and advocates argue for a right of remedial secession for regions facing 
oppression. Should states be able to claim an analogous right of “remedial 
expulsion,” or forced secession, against malefactor regions? If it is an act of “self-
determination” for the people of a region to leave a nation against the nation’s 
wishes, is the same thing true when they wish to stay against its wishes? Given 
that acquisition and possession of territory is no longer the national priority it 
once was, can nations simply let go of undesirable regions, including former 
colonial outposts?  
These are questions of immense significance for many people around the 
world. Millions live in former colonies that never became independent states1—
nearly one in six Caribbean residents, for example, lives in a region with 
constitutional ties to a former imperial power.2 Far from seeking full 
independence, such overseas territories have generally fought hard to maintain 
these ties. Meanwhile, their former colonizers often see them as politically and 
economically costly and have sought to cut them loose, leading to a situation 
some describe as “decolonization upside-down.”3 This raises serious legal 
complications, because the existing rules of international law developed to 
address what are essentially an inverse set of problems involving territorial 
acquisition, decolonization, and secession. 
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1.  ROBERT ALDRICH & JOHN CONNELL, THE LAST COLONIES 5 (1998) (noting “the UN position 
that ‘colonies’ are non-self-governing, geographically separate and ethnically and/or culturally distinct 
from the countries administering them”).  
2.  GERT OOSTINDIE & INGE KLINKERS, DECOLONISING THE CARIBBEAN: DUTCH POLICIES IN
A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 220 (2003) (“Of the total population of the Caribbean, an estimated 37 
million people, almost fifteen per cent live in areas which still maintain constitutional ties with the mother 
country.”). 
3.  Id. at 217 (“As far as Westminster was concerned, all of the former British colonies had to go.
The fact that at present a handful of Caribbean ‘Overseas Territories’ still come under the sovereignty 
of the United Kingdom should not, therefore, be attributed to the ardent wishes of Westminster, but 
rather to the stubbornness with which these islands have refused to accept independence.”).  
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To take just one example, the Netherlands cannot induce its Caribbean 
territories to favor independence.4 Maintaining the Antilles is costly to the 
Kingdom, and the current arrangement seems untenable in the long run. Does 
international law permit the Dutch to force their former colonies to accept 
independence?5 Would the answer be different if the colonies were committing 
human rights violations and had resisted all political and economic interventions?  
Our goal in this article is to identify the default rules of international law with 
regard to expulsion of national territory. We argue that the traditional rules, 
based on international law’s legitimation of imperial conquest, should be 
modified with a market-type system that permits forced secession only in limited 
circumstances, and with a penalty on the expelling nation. 
International law and practice have historically been molded by the outward 
push of nations,6 and have developed rules to cabin that pressure by, for example, 
limiting the modes of territorial acquisition. Contemporary reality is more 
complicated.7 For a variety of political and economic reasons, some nations now 
want to downsize. (The same is true of some supranational organizations, though 
these efforts raise a distinct set of political and legal issues that we and Laurence 
Helfer address in a separate paper).8 The question is whether nations can do so 
without the agreement of the regions9 they want to expel. 
 
 4.  Id. at 219. (“[M]ajor public support for the acceptance of independence [in Aruba and the 
Antilles) has never materialized. . . . However much the Dutch insisted, they simply refused to 
cooperate.”). 
 5.  Our interest here is in the default international rules. As noted below, some national charters 
forbid expulsion as a matter of domestic law.  Id. (explaining that the Dutch Charter rules out expulsion 
of Antilles); D.J. Latham Brown, The Ethiopia-Somaliland Frontier Dispute, 5 INT’L. & COMP. L.Q. 245, 
255 (1956) (noting that Britain’s alienation of Somaliland to Ethiopia might be read as violating a 
covenant “not to permit such territory to pass under the sovereignty of any other state”). But even those 
rules are not as universal as some might suppose. See Christina Duffy Burnett, Untied States: American 
Expansion and Territorial Deannexation, 72. U. CHI. L. REV. 797 (2005) (arguing that the Insular Cases 
are based on a principle of territorial deannexation that would permit the United States to expel the 
unincorporated territory of Puerto Rico). 
 6.  Andrew Burghardt, The Bases of Territorial Claims, 63 GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 225, 225 (1973) 
(“Virtually all states and empires have treated territory as being of itself good”); see also id. (quoting 
Niccolo Machiavelli: “[T]he wish to acquire more [territory] is admittedly a very natural and common 
thing; and when men succeed in this they are always praised rather than condemned.”); Bernard H. 
Oxman, The Territorial Temptation: A Siren Song at Sea, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 830, 830 (2006) (“The history 
of international law since the Peace of Westphalia is in significant measure an account of the territorial 
temptation.”). 
 7.  Although we believe that traditional notions of sovereignty have changed to a significant degree, 
we do not agree with those who suggest that we are in a post-sovereignty world. See MICHAEL KEATING, 
STATELESS NATIONS: PLURINATIONAL DEMOCRACY IN A POST-SOVEREIGNTY ERA (2004) (outlining 
the concept of post-sovereignty); Neil Walker, The Cosmopolitan Local: Neil MacCormick’s Post-
Sovereign World (Nov. 7, 2010), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1704409 
[https://perma.cc/ZZ59-Y8NG]. Quite to the contrary, nations are the central players in our framework—
our contention is that the rules governing their boundaries must account for their contraction.  
 8.  See Joseph Blocher, Mitu Gulati & Laurence A. Helfer, Can Greece be Expelled from the 
Eurozone? Toward a Default Rule on Expulsion From International Organizations, in FILLING THE GAPS 
IN GOVERNANCE: THE CASE OF EUROPE (Elena Carletti et al. eds., 2016). In addition to that chapter, 
the three of us are pursuing the question in a larger project.  
 9.  In keeping with international law’s focus on sovereign territory, we use the term region to refer 
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Many people have a strong, even visceral, intuitive response: That in the 
absence of an explicit agreement to the contrary, nothing can justify the expulsion 
of region from a nation. Some believe that international law supports this bright 
line rule against expulsion. Such arguments have been most prominent in the 
context of expelling member states from supranational organizations, rather than 
regions from nations, but the analogies initially seem convincing. If it is true that 
a member state cannot be expelled from an organization—even for invading 
another member state10—or that expulsion (perhaps like secession or 
withdrawal) is simply not a problem susceptible to legal analysis,11 then surely the 
same must be true for the expulsion of regions from nations. 
Ironically, the traditional view of international law suggests precisely the 
opposite: That a sovereign, because it is sovereign, can expel its regions (give 
them “independence” or cede them to another sovereign) almost at will, while 
an international organization—to the degree that it has the power to expel—must 
be able to identify some serious material breach. We believe that the first 
proposition is outdated and inconsistent with basic tenets of modern 
international law, especially the principle of self-determination.12 
Our analytical starting point is that the international system should not force 
regions or sovereigns to stay together in perpetuity,13 but that expulsion—like its 
conceptual sibling, secession—should nevertheless be (and maybe is, under 
existing international law) subject to restrictions. There should be exit options 
for nations that are undermined by their regions, just as remedial secession would 
 
to physical places occupied by people. Expelling a people from a territory is, as described in more detail 
below, infra part III.B, subject to a wide range of restrictions. 
 10.  See, e.g., Phoebus Athanassiou, Withdrawal and Expulsion from the EU and EMU: Some 
Reflections (European Central Bank Working Paper Series No. 10, Dec. 2009); Annie Lowrey, Could 
Greece Get Kicked Out of the European Union? No., FOREIGN POL’Y, Mar. 23, 2010, 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/03/23/could-greece-get-kicked-out-of-the-european-union/ 
[https://perma.cc/9A5L-UP6Z]. 
 11.  J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2412 (1991) (“The juridical 
conclusion is that unilateral withdrawal [from the European Community] is illegal. Exit is foreclosed. 
But this is precisely the type of legal analysis that gives lawyers a bad name in other disciplines. . . . If 
Total Exit is foreclosed, it is because of the high enmeshment of the Member States and the potential, 
real or perceived, for political and economic losses to the withdrawing state.”). 
 12.  As to the second proposition, we think that international law does permit expulsion from 
supranational organizations under certain circumstances, but that the rules are different than they are 
for nations. Blocher, Gulati & Helfer, supra note 8. 
 13.  A number of scholars, primarily from economics and political science, have also questioned the 
conventional notions that fixed national boundaries and constraining governance to members of the local 
population are optimal from the perspective of social welfare. E.g., BRUNO FREY & REINER 
EICHENBERGER, THE NEW DEMOCRATIC FEDERALISM FOR EUROPE: FUNCTIONAL, OVERLAPPING, 
AND COMPETING JURISDICTIONS (1999); Alessandara Casella & Barry R. Weingast, Elements of a 
Theory of Jurisdictional Change, in POLITICS AND INSTITUTIONS IN AN INTEGRATED EUROPE (Barry 
Eichengreen et al. eds., 1995); Jonathan Rodden & Susan-Rose Ackerman, Does Federalism Preserve 
Markets?, 83 VA. L. REV. 1521 (1997); Barry Weingast, The Economic Role of Political Institutions, 7 J.L. 
ECON. & ORG. 1 (1995); Michael J. Hiscox & David A. Lake, Democracy, Federalism and the Size of 
States, Working Paper, 2002, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1002686 
[https://perma.cc/M4NH-KDLT]. 
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provide a failsafe for regions that are oppressed by nations.14 One can think of 
this as a right of “remedial expulsion,” justified by roughly the same set of 
considerations that underlie the principle of remedial secession. 
Analyzing expulsion in legal terms is difficult, because the standard rules of 
international law were designed to address precisely the opposite set of issues: 
the rules for legitimately acquiring sovereign territory,15 or for regions to leave it 
in scenarios of extreme hardship.16 Responding to the needs of the time in which 
they were designed, the basic building blocks of international law—territorial 
integrity, equal sovereignty, and the like—do not provide clear or satisfactory 
answers to the question of expulsion.17 
Accordingly, we propose a new analytic framework with which to evaluate 
expulsion of regions from nations. We draw largely on existing rules of 
international law, but we also suggest changes—for example with respect to 
remedial secession—that we think better track the trajectory and principles 
underlying those rules. Based on the available legal materials, and synthesizing 
the conceptual and normative considerations sketched above, we describe a basic 
framework with which to evaluate expulsion.18 Our framework is not suggested 
as a mandatory rule, akin to jus cogens, that would override all agreements to the 
contrary. If a national constitution provides specific rules for or against expulsion, 
and the people (or region) being expelled can in some sense be seen as having 
assented to those rules, then they should generally be followed.19 In the absence 
of such explicit agreement, however, we see three possible default rules, the 
application of which depends on the actions and governance of the region, just as 
the rules of secession are pegged to the behavior of the state.20 
 
 14.  Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, A Market for Sovereign Control, 66 DUKE L.J. 797, 806–07 (2017) 
[hereinafter Blocher & Gulati, A Market for Sovereign Control]. 
 15.  See, e.g., R.Y. JENNINGS, THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1963); 
1 OPPENHEIM’S INTERNATIONAL LAW 434–35, 455–57 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 5th ed. 1937); Seokwoo Lee, 
Continuing Relevance of Traditional Modes of Territorial Acquisition in International Law and a Modest 
Proposal, 16 CONN. J. INT’L L. 1 (2000). 
 16.  For a description of the evolution of the self-determination concept, see Patrick Macklem, Self 
Determination in Three Movements, in THE THEORY OF SELF DETERMINATION (Fernando R. Teson 
ed., 2016). On the related concept of secession, see ALLEN BUCHANAN, JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND 
SELF-DETERMINATION: MORAL FOUNDATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW 335 (2004); LEE C. 
BUCHHEIT, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF DETERMINATION 220–23 (1978); Thomas Franck, 
Postmodern Tribalism and the Right to Secession, in PEOPLES AND MINORITIES IN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 3 (C. Brölmann et al. ed., 1993). But see Jure Vidmar, Remedial Secession in International Law: 
Theory and (Lack of) Practice, 6 ST. ANTONY’S INT’L REV. 37 (2010). 
 17.  As a matter of legal and historical development, the situation is not unlike that once faced by 
property law, whose content was long shaped by acquisition, not de-acquisition, destruction, or even basic 
questions like legal liability for injuries suffered on abandoned property. See, e.g., Lior Strahilevitz, The 
Right to Destroy, 114 YALE L.J. 781 (2005). 
 18.  See infra part IV. 
 19.  The qualifier is necessary here, because some rules of international law might be mandatory—a 
nation could no more forbid remedial expulsion than it could forbid remedial secession. Other rules 
might fall into desuetude, or lose their legitimacy over time.  
 20.  We have argued that an analogous set of considerations, tied to the quality and 
representativeness of governance, should govern remedial and “purchased” secessions. Blocher & 
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First, there should be a strong default presumption against expulsion in the 
absence of malfeasance by the region. Regions that respect their basic obligations 
cannot be involuntarily expelled, just as well-governed nations cannot be forced 
to accept secessions.21 If the union is malfunctioning, then a break must be 
negotiated with the approval of both the state and the region, as was recently 
attempted in Scotland (and may be attempted again).22 In standard cases, this 
requirement of mutual assent is the best way to accommodate the tension 
between the traditional rule of territorial sovereignty (including the power of 
cession) and the contemporary principle of self-determination. 
Second, on the opposite end of the spectrum, regions or member states that 
are misbehaving in the extreme—for example by declaring war on or otherwise 
oppressing the rest of the nation of which they are a part—can be expelled at the 
option of the nation as a whole (that is, including the political voice of the region 
itself).23 The analogy here is to the principle of remedial secession, which would 
permit regions to leave an oppressive country. The same logic supports a rule of 
“remedial expulsion” in scenarios in which the malfeasance is committed against 
the nation, rather than by it. 
There is, however, a middle category: one in which regions are not actively 
oppressing the rest of the nation, but are nonetheless falling significantly short of 
their obligations. In those scenarios, we suggest—tentatively—that the region or 
nation can be expelled, but that it is owed compensation as a result. That 
compensation must include an option to retain citizenship in the expelling 
nation.24 
This tripartite framework invites many questions and challenges. What does 
it mean for a region to respect its basic obligations to the nation? Who is, or 
should be, empowered to answer that question—an existing, or perhaps a new, 
international organization? Should claims of compensation be retroactive, such 
that residents of former colonies should still be able to claim citizenship in the 
former imperial power? Does giving regions the right to resist expulsion rely on 
self-determination, or can it be independently justified? We welcome these 
questions, and have tried to answer some of them. We note that, for the most 
part, they are about the implementation of the framework, not its soundness. 
This article seeks to show that traditional statements of international law 
seem to permit nearly unlimited powers of expulsion, and then to argue that this 
power is and should be subject to restriction. This may bother some readers, 
 
Gulati, A Market for Sovereign Control, supra note 14.   
 21.  See infra part IV.A. 
 22.  See, e.g., Steven Ernlanger & Alan Cowell, Scotland Rejects Independence From United 
Kingdom, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 18, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/19/world/europe/scotland-
independence-vote.html [https://perma.cc/UXP4-CG72]; Kimiko de Freytas-Tamura, Scotland Says New 
Vote on Independence is ‘Highly Likely’, N.Y. TIMES (June 24, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/25/world/europe/brexit-scotland-independence-referendum.html?_r=0 
[https://perma.cc/UNV4-3L9Z]. 
 23.  See infra part IV.B. 
 24.  See infra part IV.C. 
BLOCHERGULATI_FORMATTED_PREPROOF_PERMA (DO NOT DELETE) 3/14/2017  2:50 PM 
220 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 80: 215 
including those who support strong state sovereignty, those who believe in 
regional self-determination, and those who reject the notion that expulsion is 
ever permissible. As difficult as it is to navigate those competing concerns, the 
inquiry is necessary. 
II 
THE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF EXPULSION 
How can international law and practice respond to dysfunctional or otherwise 
undesirable region–state relationships? Although the particular question of 
expulsion from nations has not received much scholarly attention, the general 
institutional inquiry is familiar. In Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, A.O. Hirschman 
showed that there are two main ways in which a member of an organization can 
respond to unsatisfactory performance by that organization—either abandon the 
organization (exit), or express dissatisfaction in an effort to improve the situation 
(voice).25 In Hirschman’s words, “Exit and Voice, that is, market and non-market 
forces, that is, economic and political mechanisms, have been introduced as two 
principal actors of strictly equal rank and importance.”26 He applied this 
political–economic analysis to firms as well as to states. 
This article asks the mirror image of Hirschman’s question: How can the 
organization (here, the state), respond to unsatisfactory performance by a 
member (the region)? Voicing dissatisfaction is obviously possible, as are various 
forms of sanction. But what about the equivalent of exit: expulsion? 
Some will reject the notion of thinking about countries in these terms. For 
many people, national identities—including national borders—are an immutable 
or at least inalienable characteristic, a primordial quality that cannot or should 
not be changed, and certainly not for monetary reasons. On this view, it is a 
mistake to think about borders or nations being “tradable.” The suggested 
model, described in more detail in part III, tries to respect that view—it does not 
force changes on nations and regions that are well-governed and wish to maintain 
their allegiances. But a great many people do think of national identity as 
mutable, and the constantly-changing lines on the global map are evidence of 
ongoing efforts to reorganize national borders. Whether and how nations, and 
not just regions, do or should have control over those changes is the question at 
the heart of this project. The surprising and ongoing story of decolonization 
provides an illustration. 
  
 
 25.  ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, 
ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970). 
 26.  Id. at 19. Like Hirschman, we “hope to demonstrate to political scientists the usefulness of 
economic concepts and to economists the usefulness of political concepts. . . .” Id. 
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A. The Pull And Push Of Decolonization 
In no more than two decades between the 1950s and 1970s, vast colonial empires that 
had taken centuries to assemble almost totally disappeared. All the colonial powers 
witnessed, and sometimes expedited and encouraged, the disintegration of their global 
realms.27 
In the standard story, the twentieth century was an era of belated but 
welcome decolonization. European empires on which the sun never set began 
retreating to the shadows, responding to demands for self-governance and 
independence. Of course, even with support from the international community, 
and often from their former colonizers, the road was not easy for former colonies. 
Yet the story of decolonization is generally regarded as a transition from 
oppression to dependence to freedom, all in response to demands from the 
colonies themselves. 
Consider, however, a different reading of the history and the resulting state 
of affairs: 
Although it has been argued that, especially in the British case, precipitous 
decolonization was a result of ‘every remaining dependency . . . impatiently demanding 
equal independence and receiving it in very short order’, in fact, the converse was often 
true, and not only in the smallest colonies. The Australian desire to grant independence 
to Papua New Guinea was much greater than local demand; the Solomon Islands, 
Vanuatu and Mauritius went to independence as much with trepidation as jubilation. 
These island states were not isolated exceptions, but were representative of the end of 
one era and the dawn of another.28 
This is a story of push, not of pull, and it raises uncomfortable questions for 
the legality and desirability of expulsion, especially for the millions of people still 
living in “territories,” “departments,” and other designations for former colonies. 
In the background of this alternative story lies a radical shift in incentives 
both for the former colonial powers and for the territories they control. Put 
simply: by the time the wave of decolonization crested after the Second World 
War,29 many colonies were no longer profitable investments.30 European nations, 
having extracted what value they could from their far-flung colonies, now saw 
resources flowing in the opposite direction as nations paid to support the 
comparatively poor residents of their overseas territories. Increased attention to 
human rights and equality in the post–World War II era made it much harder to 
treat some subjects of the empire as second or third class citizens vis-à-vis their 
former masters.31 As a matter of domestic politics, it was once cheap to promise 
some form of citizenship—or at least national membership—to far-flung 
 
 27.  ALDRICH & CONNELL, supra note 1, at 113 (emphasis added). 
 28.  Id. at 246.  
 29.  Id. at 1 (“The age of decolonisation is usually regarded as having peaked during the 1960s. . . .”).  
 30.  Id. at 60 (“Much evidence suggests that contemporary overseas territories have tended to be an 
economic cost to the colonial powers, most obviously in recent times.”); OOSTINDIE & KLINKERS, supra 
note 2, at 216 (“Once cherished as the ‘darlings of empire,’ the colonial possessions had turned into 
economic millstones.”). 
 31.  E.g., NOEL MAURER, THE EMPIRE TRAP: THE RISE AND FALL OF U.S. INTERVENTION TO 
PROTECT PROPERTY OVERSEAS, 1893–2010, 236–42 (2013) (describing the U.S.–Philippines 
relationship in the early to mid-1900s and the U.S. desire to avoid giving rights to outsiders). 
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residents. But the value (and corresponding cost) of that citizenship soon 
increased in direct proportion to the access it gave to the homeland itself. Once 
upon a time, European nations might well have benefited by maintaining 
Caribbean outposts that their residents could easily access. Eventually, however, 
the planes back to Europe were carrying more than sunburned tourists.32 
And then there is the fact that the influence, wealth, and power of nations 
inevitably evolves over time. When Britain was an imperial power, holding on to 
overseas territories was not terribly onerous, even in the face of hostility from 
other nations regarding those occupations. That was particularly so when those 
other nations were relatively weak in terms of their ability to impose costs on 
Britain. For example, Chinese opposition had relatively little effect on British 
control of Hong Kong in the 1800s.33 But China became a great economic and 
military power, which probably helps explain why, when China demanded Hong 
Kong back in the 1980s, Britain agreed to return it. And it did so even though 
surveys suggest that the people of Hong Kong would have preferred to stay 
British subjects—or, at least, would have preferred to stay independent of the 
mainland Chinese government.34 
The incentives of colonies vis-à-vis independence have also changed, albeit in 
precisely inverse fashion. Existing colonial territories overwhelmingly oppose 
independence,35 and they have pushed towards the center more than they have 
tried to pull away from it.36 Those that remain colonies are those that have 
successfully resisted efforts to make them independent.37 In fact, “[i]n no territory 
has a majority of the electorate cast its vote for parties or politicians who 
unequivocally demand independence.”38 This is especially true in smaller, more 
 
 32.  OOSTINDIE & KLINKERS, supra note 2, at 223–24 (“[T]here is the factor of perspectives. 
Freedom of migration, for example, may be deemed crucial to the individual Caribbean migrant who will 
therefore be satisfied with a metropolitan passport and the right of abode, whereas in the metropolis this 
may be experienced by locals as an aggravating factor in social issues.”). This is of course an 
oversimplification. As Aldrich and Connell note, “[b]y the 1980s the most rapid phase of emigration from 
the territories had ended: the economies of metropolitan states faced recession, governments actively 
discouraged immigration and a conservative backlash threatened migrants.” ALDRICH & CONNELL, 
supra note 1, at 104. 
 33.  For historical detail, see, e.g., JONATHAN D. SPENCE, THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA (2d 
ed. 1999); FRANK WELSH, A BORROWED PLACE: THE HISTORY OF HONG KONG (1993). 
 34.  For a discussion, see Blocher & Gulati, A Market for Sovereign Control, supra note 14. 
 35.  ALDRICH & CONNELL, supra note 1, at 117 (“Support for independence [of Puerto Rico], in 
various forms, has remained strikingly consistent in the post-war years, but has always been tiny.”); id. at 
121 (noting that a majority opposed independence in French Polynesia even after French resumption of 
nuclear testing led to riots; “[t]hose who opposed independence expressed concern over the decline of 
French economic support”); id. at 124 (noting lack of support for independence in Martinique and 
Guadeloupe); id. at 139 (noting Cocos (Keeling) Islanders’ and Christmas Islanders’ overwhelming 
rejection of independence from Australia); id. at 140 (“Mayotte, having voted against independence in 
1976, with 99.4 per cent of the electorate choosing France, seems destined to remain a French outpost for 
the foreseeable future. . . .”).  
 36.  Id. at 165 (“Rather than move towards independence, territories have welcomed, even 
demanded, the greater involvement of metropolitan states.”).  
 37.  OOSTINDIE & KLINKERS, supra note 2, at 217.  
 38.  ALDRICH & CONNELL, supra note 1, at 247.  
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isolated territories, where opposition to independence is “almost unanimous” 
and has rarely even been considered despite support from the UN Special 
Committee on Decolonisation39: 
Indeed, when Britain withdrew from its Pacific colonies in the 1970s Pitcairn resisted 
every effort of the United Kingdom to ‘get off the hook’, ensuring that it remained a 
‘captive patron’. The inhabitants of Anguilla and Mayotte actively resisted any move 
towards independence.40 
Such sentiment is not limited to the smallest territories,41 however Robert 
Aldrich and John Connell note: “In every contemporary territory, powerful 
reasons exist for choosing continued political ties with metropolitan powers; they 
range from concerns over security (from local civil or political unrest rather than 
external aggression), to dependence on transfer payments (in various forms) and 
access to migration opportunities.”42 
The economic incentives are straightforward enough. With a few exceptions 
like Bermuda, the majority of former colonies are poorer than their colonizers 
(albeit richer than their neighbors,43 which is also significant), and many are 
dependent on external aid and subsidies.44 Some residents support independence 
no matter the “cost,” on the basis of dignity or other interests.45 But for many 
others, dignity and self-governance are predicated on some degree of economic 
stability. As a member of Montserrat’s Legislative Council said to the UN Special 
Committee on Decolonisation: 
Poverty is indeed a barrier to self-respect. Sovereignty based on poverty is a sham. 
Decolonisation that is a licence for mendicancy is a misnomer. So let the UN join us in 
a meaningful attempt to improve the economies of our small islands. Only then can we 
start to initiate meaningful discussion on the decolonisation process that will bring 
respect, dignity, and happiness to the people of Montserrat.46 
In addition to obvious transfer payments, “compensation” comes in the form 
of nationality or citizenship in the metropolitan power. Indeed, for some 
residents of these former colonies, the single most valuable asset they might 
 
 39.  Id. at 139.  
 40.  Id. at 137 (internal citation omitted).  
 41.  Id. at 144 (“Whilst the smallest territories were often wholly opposed to any movement towards 
independence, opposition was also exceptionally powerful in such large territories as the French 
Caribbean départements . . . and in islands like Guam, where inhabitants sought stronger ties with the 
metropolitan power.”).  
 42.  Id. at 164.  
 43.  Id. at 99; see also OOSTINDIE & KLINKERS, supra note 2, at 220 (“These non-self-governing 
territories may in many respects be less developed compared with their mother countries, but within their 
own region they make up the leading group of most privileged states.”).  
 44.  ALDRICH & CONNELL, supra note 1, at 112 (“Finance and tourism have enabled some well-
placed territories to avoid the drift towards the dominance of the government sector, but most are highly 
dependent on the metropole, which has given them an economic security that would otherwise be 
impossible.”).  
 45.  “The aspiration for independence is not simply reducible to economic categories or a history of 
development. Colonisation and decolonisation remain fundamentally a question of dignity.” Id. at 113 
(quoting Paul Neaoutyine, the former President of the FLNKS).  
 46.  Id. at 126; (quoting island’s chief minister: “We are not going into independence unless we are 
going to get more jobs, more bread and butter on the table. We will not be pushed into independence.”). 
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receive is a passport or, perhaps better yet, a right to work,47 although this 
entitlement was not initially given to all subjects of the former colonies.48 Nor are 
colonial residents necessarily treated equally with regard to other political rights. 
What if a nation wanted to wipe these costs off the books by expelling its 
former colonies, perhaps with the pretext of granting them independence? The 
question is anything but abstract. The globe is still covered with colonies, in which 
millions of people live:49 
Portugal did not withdraw from its oldest colony, Macao, nor from its Atlantic islands. 
Spain remained in two North Africa enclaves and the Canary Islands. Britain and 
France kept a scatter of possessions around the world. Denmark continued to influence 
Greenland and the Faeroes, and even the Netherlands held on to two groups of islands 
in the Caribbean. European powers were not alone; the United States retained 
‘territories’ and ‘commonwealths’ in the Pacific and Caribbean, notably Puerto Rico 
and Guam. . . . These various territories—or some of them—may really be the last 
colonies.50 
Their continuing existence shows that the history of decolonization is not 
over; it’s not even past.51 
For some colonies, domestic law might provide a safe haven against 
expulsion.52 But not always. In the U.S. context, Christina Duffy Ponsa has 
argued that the Insular Cases established that unincorporated territories like 
Puerto Rico “could be separated from the United States, or what I call here 
‘deannexed,’ as long as they remained unincorporated. Preserving the option of 
deannexation was precisely the reason not to incorporate a territory in the first 
place.”53 Set against the contemporary headlines, this raises a very uncomfortable 
 
 47.  Id. at 108–09 (“[M]ost territories would prefer the kind of metropolitan access that is available 
to residents of French and other territories. . . . In some cases, as in the Cook Islands, this is a key factor 
discouraging demands for independence.”); OOSTINDIE & KLINKERS, supra note 2, at 220 (noting that 
non-self-governing states enjoy and intensely use the “right of abode in the metropolis”). 
 48.  OOSTINDIE & KLINKERS, supra note 2, at 222 (noting that the French territories in the 
Caribbean “are French citizens in every respect” and that the “Dutch and American governments also 
have pursued a policy a free immigration from the Caribbean territories,” albeit without voting rights; 
since 1999, “British citizenship (and so the right of abode) has been offered to those people of the 
Overseas Territories who did not already enjoy it.”); see also ALDRICH & CONNELL, supra note 1, at 138 
(noting that residents of St. Helena had argued that they should be entitled to full British citizenship; in 
the words of a 1996 report: “Saint Helenians are not trying to become British. They are already, and 
always have been British.”).  
 49.  ALDRICH & CONNELL, supra note 1, at 1 (“In an era that is bravely, and sometimes cynically, 
touted as one of a New World Order, there is something seemingly paradoxical about the continued 
presence of colonies in a supposedly post-colonial world.”). 
 50.  Id. at 2. 
 51.  Cf. WILLIAM FAULKNER, REQUIEM FOR A NUN 92 (1951) (“The past is never dead. It’s not 
even past.”); see also John Fabian Witt, Anglo-American Empire and the Crisis of the Legal Frame (Will 
the Real British Empire Please Stand Up?), 120 HARV. L. REV. 754, 755 (2007) (“It has been at least a 
century . . . since the model of empire was so hotly contested in American public life.”). 
 52.  OOSTINDIE & KLINKERS, supra note 2, at 219 (“Even if The Hague had wanted this, the Charter 
does not allow for the imposition of independence on the islands against their own will. Through decade 
after decade Antillean and Aruban administrators have made clever use of this fact. However much the 
Dutch insisted, they simply refused to cooperate.”). 
 53.  Burnett, supra note 5, at 802; id. at 854 (“[T]he doctrine of territorial incorporation did have 
something to add to the Court’s territorial jurisprudence—namely, it established the constitutionality of 
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possibility. The people of Puerto Rico have consistently opposed independence 
from the United States.54 But what would international law say if—perhaps in 
light of the island’s current debt crisis55—the rest of the United States were to 
attempt to force it on them? 
Perversely, such efforts at forcible decolonization might draw support from 
earlier statements against colonialism. For example, the Declaration on the 
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples (Resolution 1514), 
adopted by the UN General Assembly in 1960, described “the passionate 
yearning for freedom in all dependent peoples” and found that “all peoples have 
an inalienable right to complete freedom, the exercise of their sovereignty and 
the integrity of their national territory.”56 If the right to “complete freedom” 
really exists, and is “inalienable,” then the expulsion we describe could be not 
only permissible but required.57 On this reading, colonies might have not only a 
right but an obligation to be independent, and the former colonizers must 
facilitate that change. Indeed, it has been said that Resolution 1514 “reflect[ed] 
the prevailing international view that decolonisation via accession to sovereignty 
was perceived as necessary and desirable.”58 Resolving these issues means 
navigating a central tension in international law: That between the territorial 
integrity of sovereigns (which would treat nations as the only relevant players) 
and the self-determination of peoples (which would allow the colonies 
themselves to have the final say). 
  
 
territorial deannexation.”); see also Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 307–08 (1901) (White, J., 
concurring) (“Suppose at the termination of a war the hostile government had been overthrown and the 
entire territory or a portion thereof was occupied by the United States, and . . . it became necessary for 
the United States to hold the conquered country for an indefinite period, or at least until such time as 
Congress deemed that it should be either released or retained because it was apt for incorporation into 
the United States.”); Paul R. Shipman, Webster on the Territories, 9 YALE L.J. 185, 206 (1900) (arguing 
that there was no moral or constitutional obligation to retain Puerto Rico); Edward B. Whitney, The 
Porto Rico Tariffs of 1899 and 1900, 9 YALE L.J. 297, 314 (1900) (arguing that annexed territory could 
be ceded). On the broader issues, see generally JOSÉ A. CABRANES, CITIZENSHIP AND THE AMERICAN 
EMPIRE: NOTES ON THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP OF PUERTO 
RICANS (1979). 
 54.  Burnett, supra note 5, at 871–72. 
 55.  Mary Williams Walsh, Puerto Rican Officials Warn Congress of Major Defaults Without 
Restructuring, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/06/business/dealbook/ 
puerto-rico-ready-to-accept-federal-control-in-return-for-help-in-debtrestructuring.html?_r=0 [https:// 
perma.cc/J2ZH-CPB4]. 
 56.  Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A. Res. 1514, 
U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66-67, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960). 
 57.  Many rights guarantee a freedom to choose whether to engage in the protected conduct; 
inalienable rights typically do not.  See generally Joseph Blocher, Rights To and Not To, 100 CAL. L. REV. 
761 (2012). 
 58.  ALDRICH & CONNELL, supra note 1, at 158.  
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The point here is emphatically not to suggest that former colonies should be 
happy with their lot as territories,59 but rather to illustrate that the story of 
decolonization involves colonial powers acting on their own incentives in 
addition to former colonies pursuing theirs, and that the balance of incentives 
with regard to independence may have changed. That raises the question at the 
center of this project: Could colonizers loudly proclaim their own guilt, argue that 
their sovereignty over the territories is not only voidable but void,60 and then 
expel the former colonies for which they no longer have any use? 
Moreover, the issue of expulsion is not limited to former colonies. One can 
imagine all kinds of scenarios in which a nation might want to rid itself of a region 
on the basis of religious or political differences, or even a straightforward 
financial cost–benefit analysis. The initial question, then, is whether expulsion 
should ever be an option. We think it should, albeit not in the unlimited way that 
international law currently suggests. And in some (perhaps most) cases, the 
expeller should have to pay for doing so. 
B. Against a Bright Line Prohibition On Expulsion 
Expulsion is an extreme remedy, so if it is ever to be an option then one must 
consider the kinds of extreme circumstances that might justify its use: those in 
which a union is malfunctioning in a way that inflicts serious harms on the people 
within it. 
Imagine a region that persistently violates the basic principles of its nation, 
for example through ongoing human rights violations or persistent and severe 
economic corruption and waste. The nation responds with admonitions, political 
pressure, even economic sanctions and troops, all to no avail—“voice,” in 
Hirschman’s terms, has been ineffective. 
Most people do not have a strong intuition that such malfunctioning unions 
must continue. Indeed, a great deal of effort in international law and practice has 
been devoted to facilitating the termination of malfunctioning unions by 
permitting regions to exit.61 Such exits can improve overall welfare in the short 
run by ending the painful relationship, while also deterring nations from inflicting 
harms on their regions. 
The same logic applies in the opposite direction. After all, the costs of a 
harmful political union are reciprocal62—the union and its units all suffer from 
conflict. In the standard case, those costs are thought to be the fault of the nation, 
which is why the region gets the exit option. This is sensible enough, because the 
nation is usually the one with the power—the least cost avoider, in some sense. 
 
 59.  Cf. Christina D. Burnett, The Case for Puerto Rican Decolonization, 45 ORBIS 433 (2001). 
 60.  Cf. A. RIGO-SUREDA, THE EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION—A STUDY 
OF UNITED NATIONS PRACTICE 353 (1973) (“[W]ithin the context of colonialism, self-determination has 
become a per-emptory norm of International Law whereby a state’s title to a territory having colonial 
status is void.”).  
 61.  See infra part III. 
 62.  Cf. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960). 
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But the state will not always be the one at fault, nor will it always have the 
power to remedy the situation. If a minority region, even without dominating the 
national levers of power,63 can inflict serious harms on others—the kind of harms 
that would justify secession if inflicted by a state on region—then expulsion 
should be an option, even if not the first. Arguably, this is what happened in 
Algeria in the 1960s, when it was part of the French empire and the French 
seemed intent on keeping as much of that empire together as possible. However, 
the Algerian independence movement imposed immense costs on the French 
government; to the point where the French decided to leave, essentially expelling 
Algeria and its local population from French citizenship and EU membership.64 
History is littered with numerous other examples in which a colony or region 
imposes such high costs on the rump state that it leaves; essentially expelling the 
trouble-making region.65 Of course, nations are generally more able and likely to 
exploit their regions than vice versa, so the standard for expulsion should perhaps 
be higher than that for exit. But that is a matter of when and how, not whether, 
the option should be available. 
There is at least one scenario in which expulsion might indeed be off the table, 
and that is where the nation itself has specified as much in its domestic law. For 
example, most constitutional lawyers would probably take the view that no 
matter the misconduct, it is constitutionally out of the question for the United 
States to expel an individual state, no matter what it does.66 Some supranational 
organizations might have similar agreements of perpetual union in their 
constitutive documents. These explicit agreements regarding expulsion should 
generally be followed, especially where they specify the process of expulsion. 
  
 
 63.  If the minority effectively controls the national government, then we do not think of it as a 
minority, at least vis-à-vis the nation.  
 64.  For discussions of this history, see e.g., NEIL MACMASTER, COLONIAL MIGRANTS AND 
RACISM: ALGERIANS IN FRANCE, 1900–62 (1997): TODD SHEPARD, THE INVENTION OF 
DECOLONIZATION: THE ALGERIAN WAR AND THE REMAKING OF FRANCE (2006). 
 65.  The precise role of economics in both the rise and fall of colonial empires is much debated.  
However, there is no doubt that high costs often played a role in determining whether an imperial power 
was going to exit a colony.  See, e.g., P.J. CAIN & A.G. HOPKINS, BRITISH IMPERIALISM: 1688–2000 
(2001); D. K. FIELDHOUSE, The Economic Dimensions of British and French Decolonization in Black 
Africa, in BLACK AFRICA 1945–1980: ECONOMIC DECOLONIZATION AND ARRESTED DEVELOPMENT 
3 (1986); Herschel I. Grossman & Murat F. Iyigun, The Profitability of Colonial Investment, 7 ECON. & 
POLITICS 229 (1995). 
 66.  Cf. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 317 (1901) (White, J., concurring) (“[F]rom the exigency 
of a calamitous war or the necessity of a settlement of boundaries, it may be that citizens of the United 
States may be expatriated by the action of the treatymaking power, impliedly or expressly ratified by 
Congress. But [this] . . . cannot justify the general proposition that territory which is an integral part of 
the United States may, as a mere act of sale, be disposed of.”); STANLEY K. LAUGHLIN, JR., THE LAW 
OF UNITED STATES TERRITORIES AND AFFILIATED JURISDICTIONS § 7:2 at 113 (1995) (“If the Civil 
War had established the indivisibility of this Nation, arguably a territory could never be granted 
independence once it was incorporated in the Union and its residents made citizens.”); DAVID M. 
PLETCHER, THE DIPLOMACY OF ANNEXATION: TEXAS, OREGON, AND THE MEXICAN WAR 327, 332 
(1973) (noting that the power of the President and Congress to cede American territory was also disputed 
in the context of the Oregon boundary dispute with Britain).  
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That said, it is not entirely obvious that a nation or organization should be 
able to legitimately forbid expulsion in all cases. Perhaps the power to expel 
should always be there to provide an escape valve in extreme cases in which the 
costs of staying together are simply too high. After all, the principle of remedial 
secession cannot be contracted around, precisely because it is designed to permit 
exit in situations where a powerful party is imposing costs on a weaker one, in a 
fashion that one can safely say was not contracted for (or should not have been), 
and should not be permitted. Expulsion should be a default option, but not 
necessarily a mandatory one. 
In any event, the rules regarding expulsion usually are not specified. But the 
lack of an explicit expulsion provision should not preclude the option any more 
than the lack of a pre-nuptial agreement should preclude the possibility of 
divorce. As a default rule, and subject to proper limitations, expulsion should be 
possible. And once one crosses that hurdle, then the question is what rules should 
govern its use. 
C. National Incentives 
The challenge is not evaluating the availability or desirability of expulsion in 
the abstract, but rather establishing when and how it should be an option in 
practice. Just as a bright line default rule against expulsion should be rejected, so 
too should a regime in which it is an unrestricted option—part III identifies 
limitations within international law. As with many issues in international law and 
practice, however, the most important limitations would probably be imposed by 
the political incentives of the nations themselves. 
Hirschman suggested that the choice between voice and exit depends on the 
degree to which members think they can influence the organization and the  
likelihood of its improvement, as measured against the relative certainty of exit.67 
The analogous principle holds true in the context of expulsion: A nation will 
prefer expulsion when it believes that the region either cannot be induced to 
cooperate or that the costs of inducing such cooperation are too high (for 
example, involving violence or a high level of subsidies paid by other actors). On 
the other hand, the threat of expulsion gives regions an incentive to behave—
particularly when membership in the nation brings significant benefits and 
expulsion is taken as a negative signal by future partners of the misbehaving 
region.68 
Viewed purely in terms of national incentives, the availability of expulsion 
might impose costs on the system. The prospect of nations and organizations 
 
 67.  HIRSCHMAN, supra note 25, at 77.  
 68.  Cf. Laurence R. Helfer, Exiting Treaties, 91 VA. L. REV. 1579, 1583–84 (2005) (noting that 
sometimes “states pursue exit (and threats of exit) not to dissociate themselves from future cooperation 
with other nations, but . . . as a strategy to increase their voice within an intergovernmental organization 
or treaty-based negotiating forum”); Timothy Meyer, Power, Exit Costs, and Renegotiation in 
International Law, 51 HARV. INT’L L.J. 379, 382 (2010) (“A credible threat to exit an international 
agreement confers power on a state by allowing the state to demand a greater share of the gains from 
cooperation in exchange for participating.”). 
BLOCHERGULATI_FORMATTED_PREPROOF_PERMA (DO NOT DELETE) 3/14/2017  2:50 PM 
No. 1 2017] FORCED SECESSIONS 229 
dissolving easily might create a disincentive for individual parties to invest in the 
collaboration in the first place, since they might be opportunistically expelled at 
any point (absent the presence of strong non-legal sanctions such as reputation).69 
Nations might use the threat of abandonment to coercively bargain with their 
regions or members perceived to be underperforming.70 Even contemplating the 
possibility of expulsion, some have argued, might corrode the kind of 
commitment necessary to make nations and organizations function properly.71 
In practice, we suspect that political incentives will militate against expulsion, 
just as they strongly dissuade nations from withdrawing from treaties even where 
no legal remedy would be available to the other party or parties.72 Likewise, 
international organizations that have the power to expel a breaching member 
have rarely chosen to exercise it.73 Plus, if the possibility of expulsion is so 
corrosive to relationships among regions that collaborate to form a nation, they 
can include no-expulsion clauses in their constitutions or other formative treaty 
agreements. These sorts of no-expulsion clauses appear to be rare. Indeed, the 
traditional rules of international law would give nations the power to cede regions 
as they see fit, and yet, at least for the past century or so, nations have rarely 
chosen to do so. 
The incentives are not hard to imagine. A nation that expels a region or 
member would earn a costly reputation as an unreliable partner,74 thereby losing 
future opportunities for collaboration. Expulsion might even be interpreted to 
free the expelled region from its existing obligations—an argument often 
advanced against expelling breaching members from international 
 
 69.  Cf. Joel P. Trachtman, The Economic Structure of the Law of International Organizations, 15 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 162, 179 (2014) (“[A]s the cost of exit is reduced, the binding force of international law 
is also reduced.”).  
 70.  Cf. Meyer, supra note 68, at 379 (noting that in reaching international agreements, “ascendant” 
states will typically negotiate either for a higher share of benefits or easier exit).  
 71.  Cf. Jerzy Makarczyk, Legal Basis for Suspension and Expulsion of a State from an International 
Organization, 25 GERMAN Y.B. INT’L L. 476, 477 (1982) (“[S]uspension or expulsion of a member may 
cause damage to the organization as well, and even to the whole concept of organized international 
cooperation. . . .”). 
 72.  Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International Custom, 120 YALE L.J. 202, 
259 (2010) (“[T]o the extent that there are incentives to comply with international law, such as 
reputational considerations, those incentives will presumably continue to exist despite a right of 
withdrawal.”) (internal citation omitted); Rachel Brewster, Unpacking the State’s Reputation, 50 HARV. 
INT’L L.J. 231 (2009); Meyer, supra note 68, at 394 (“Retaliation and reputational sanctions, though, 
remain available to curb unauthorized exit. In particular, unauthorized exit is a violation of a legal 
obligation that can result in a reduction of a state’s reputation for complying with legal rules.”); 
Trachtman, supra note 69, at 165–66 (“While exit is often formally costless, it can be substantively costly: 
the costs of lost opportunities for cooperation may exceed the benefits of exit.”). 
 73.  See CHRIS. BRUMMER, SOFT LAW AND THE GLOBAL SYSTEM: RULE MAKING IN THE 21ST 
CENTURY (2015); Boyko Blagoev, Expulsion of a Member State from the EU after Lisbon: Political 
Threat or Legal Reality?, 16 TILBURG L. REV. 191, 192 (2011).   
 74.  Helfer, supra note 68, at 1622 (“Three variables in particular stand out in assessing exit’s 
distinctive reputational effects: (1) the frequency of denunciation and withdrawal; (2) the relationship 
between entering and exiting treaties; and (3) the risks of opportunism in light of the pervasive 
uncertainty of international affairs.”). 
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organizations.75 And though the forces that hold nations together may have 
weakened in some cases, they have not completely disappeared. In Hirschman’s 
terms, loyalty to an organization (whether a nation or a brand) will reduce the 
likelihood of exit. Presumably, the bonds of loyalty—patriotism, pride, culture, 
and the like—will generally be strong within nations (less so within supranational 
organizations), and they therefore will not seek thoughtlessly to expel their own 
regions. The exercise of voice through the normal mechanisms of domestic 
politics will likely always be the first option. 
But it is not enough to rely on the existence of political incentives, because 
the overuse of expulsion could also threaten the legal rights of regions or 
members.76 Allowing nations to expel regions or members could trample their 
interest in, or perhaps right to, self-determination.77 It could also lead to problems 
of statelessness, if the expelled region were left to fend for itself, or generate 
further oppression, if it were expelled into a repressive regime. These problems 
are too serious to be left solely to a prediction of national political incentives. The 
preferable solution, and indeed the best reading of contemporary law, is to 
provide a set of rules to prevent many of these problems.78 
In trying to strike a balance between enabling expulsion and regulating it, this 
endeavor is situated uncomfortably between those who think that law forbids 
expulsion and those who think that the question is simply one of power and 
politics.79 The former camp is wrong about the content of law—the traditional 
rules of international law do not forbid expulsion, and actually make it too easy. 
The latter camp is wrong about the significance of law—although economic and 
political incentives are important drivers of national behavior, those incentives 
are responsive to law. 
III 
THE LAW OF EXPULSION 
Traditional rules of international law give some guidance on the issue of 
expulsion, but those rules are problematic—they give countries nearly unlimited 
power to expel regions through cession. Such a power is hard to square with the 
 
 75.  Louis B. Sohn, Expulsion or Forced Withdrawal from an International Organization, 77 HARV. 
L. REV. 1381, 1388 (1964) (in the context of USSR’s invasion of Finland, “Colombia made what was to 
become a stock argument against expulsion—that to expel the U.S.S.R. would release it from the 
obligations imposed by the Covenant and thus make it easier for the Soviet Government to achieve its 
aims”). 
 76.  Makarczyk, supra note 71, at 481 (“This capacity to suspend a member state—unlimited by law 
and subjected only to the broadly defined ‘interest of the organization’—brings indeed to mind a position 
of a subordinated entity, imposed on sovereign states . . . even if formally with their initial consent.”). 
 77.  As we discuss in more detail below, the issue is actually more complicated. If the nation does 
not want the region, then the national majority’s self-determination rights are also in play.  
 78.  See infra part III.B. 
 79.  See also Blagoev, supra note 73, at 192 (“[F]ew authors have considered the question whether 
the expulsion of a Member State from the EU is legally possible. The intention to expel a Member State 
has been predominantly political, so it would be important to see whether such a possibility is legally 
available.”). 
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principle of self-determination. Accordingly, this part proposes some 
modifications, and notes some general principles of international law—
prohibitions on physical expulsion and statelessness, for example—that would 
limit the terms of any particular expulsion. 
A. Between Cession And Self-Determination 
It is for the people to determine the destiny of the territory and not the territory the 
destiny of the people.80 
Nations have long had the power to cede territory without consulting the 
people living in that territory, and the world map reflects many examples of 
regions being expelled from their mother country and taken in by another, or 
sometimes simply left to fend for themselves. The power to expel looks like a 
form of the power to cede, which is well-established in international law. 
Legally and otherwise, this reading of the rule gives too much power to 
countries, and not enough to the people living within them. The ascendance of 
the principle of self-determination (and its counterpart remedial secession), as 
well as changes in international practice, suggest that nations must obtain the 
approval of the people living in ceded territory, at least so long that region is 
respecting its basic obligations to the nation. Further, regardless of their power 
to cede territory, nations must respect collateral rules regarding citizenship, 
ongoing treaty obligations, and the like. 
1. Cession 
Traditionally, international law has accepted the power of states to acquire 
and dispose of sovereign territory through cession, defined by Oppenheim as “the 
transfer of sovereignty over state territory by the owner-state to another state.”81 
Importantly, national agreement—and not that of the relevant regions—is all 
that is required by the traditional rule: 
The hardship involved for the inhabitants of the territory who remain and lose their old 
citizenship and are handed over to a new sovereign whether they like it or not, created 
a movement in favour of the claim that no cession should be valid until the inhabitants 
had by plebiscite given their consent to the cession . . . But it cannot be said that 
international law makes it a condition of every cession that it should be ratified by a 
plebiscite.82 
 
 80.  Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12, para. 122 (Oct. 16) (separate opinion of Dillard, J.). 
 81.  OPPENHEIM, supra note 15, at 679. See also JENNINGS, supra note 15, at 16 (defining cession as 
“the renunciation made by one State in favour of another of the rights and title which the former may 
have to the territory in question. . . . It is a bilateral mode of acquisition in that it requires the co-operation 
of the two States concerned, whereas all the other modes are unilateral.”); see also 3 J.H.W. VERZIJL, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 366–378 (1970) (categorizing cessions as involving 
either gratuitous transfer, sale, or exchange of territory); Amos S. Hershey, The Succession of States, 5 
AM. J. INT’L L. 285, 285 (1911) (describing a situation in which “a state acquires a portion of the territory 
of another through cession or conquest” as “[p]artial succession”). 
 82.  OPPENHEIM, supra note 15, at 684.  
BLOCHERGULATI_FORMATTED_PREPROOF_PERMA (DO NOT DELETE) 3/14/2017  2:50 PM 
232 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 80: 215 
Other classic83 and modern authorities are in accord.84 Stephen Ratner notes 
that “states generally are free to agree on the disposition of disputed noncolonial 
(or non-trust or –mandated) territory and its ultimate borders as they see fit.”85 
Seokwoo Lee similarly concludes: 
International law does not seem to prescribe any specific limits on the right of a state to 
cede its territory. Accordingly, ‘sovereign States are free to transfer any of their own 
territories to one another. . . . All that matters is that the cession takes place with the 
full “consent of the Governments concerned.”86 
This is not a legal authority that exists in the abstract—it is one that nations 
have employed throughout history. Some cessions have been conducted for the 
sake of political convenience, some in the aftermath of war, and some for 
straightforward financial reasons.87 
Although the power of cession has few internal limits (agreement of the 
relevant nations is all that seems to be required), it is not free from constraint. 
For example, some argue that the power of cession must be reconciled with the 
“established rule of international law that a State may not deport or expel its own 
nationals.”88 This may impose constraints on the actual mode of transfer, for 
example by requiring that residents in an expelled region be given the option to 
retain their citizenship.89 
  
 
 83.  WILLIAM EDWARD HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 49 (3d ed. 1884) (“The 
principle that the wishes of a population are to be consulted when the territory which they inhabit is 
ceded, has not been adopted into international law, and cannot be adopted into it until the title by 
conquest has disappeared.”). The latter obstacle may well have been removed—it is not clear that a title 
to conquest would still be recognizable. SHARON KORMAN, THE RIGHT OF CONQUEST: THE 
ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY BY FORCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND PRACTICE 40 (1996) 
(concluding that, today, the “right of conquest [is] unacceptable not only in terms of international 
morality but also in terms of international law”). 
 84.  See, e.g., Lee, supra note 15, at 19 (“[T]here is no serious contention to the effect that 
international law, especially in a non-colonial context, makes the conduct of a plebiscite mandatory in an 
inhabited territory that is the subject of rival sovereignty claims.”); Steven R. Ratner, Land Feuds and 
Their Solutions: Finding International Law Beyond the Tribunal Chamber, 100 AM. J. INT’L. L. 808, 811 
(2006) (“[D]espite the evolution of the norm of self-determination of peoples, states are still under no 
general duty to consult or act according to the wishes of the population of a disputed territory with respect 
to its future status.”). 
 85.  Ratner, supra note 84, at 811. Colonial territory is subject to the rule of uti possidetis, though 
even that rule can be contracted around. Joshua Castellino, Territorial Integrity and the “Right” to Self-
Determination: An Examination of the Conceptual Tools, 33 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 499, 545 & n.262 (2008) 
(noting that, despite uti possidetis, “it has always been possible to change boundaries through the consent 
of the state parties”); Ratner, supra note 84, at 811. 
 86.  Lee, supra note 15, at 10 (quoting 1 GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AS 
APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 303 (1957)); Castellino, supra note 85, at 566 
(“The law as it stands suggests that uti possidetis juris lines may be modified by consent.”). 
 87.  For examples, see Blocher & Gulati, A Market for Sovereign Control, supra note 14. 
 88.  THE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS ACROSS BORDERS 85 (Louis B. Sohn & Thomas Buergenthal 
eds., 1992). See generally JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS, MASS EXPULSION IN MODERN INTERNATIONAL 
LAW AND PRACTICE (1995). 
 89.  See infra part III.C. 
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2. Self-Determination 
Despite the breadth of the cession power, there have always been dissenters, 
questioning the power of nations to cede or expel sovereign territory. Vattel, to 
take one prominent example, accepted the power of nations to alienate public 
property,90 but would have placed some restrictions on their ability to transfer 
sovereign control over people: 
Some have dared to advance this monstrous principle, that the conqueror is absolute 
master of his conquest,—that he may dispose of it as his property …; and hence they 
derive one of the sources of despotic government. But, disregarding such writers, who 
reduce men to the state of transferable goods or beasts of burthen,—who deliver them 
up as the property or patrimony of another man,—let us argue on principles 
countenanced by reason and conformable to humanity.91 
Vattel was unconvinced by the apparent examples to the contrary: 
I know that many authors, and particularly Grotius, give long enumerations of the 
alienations of sovereignties. But the examples often prove only the abuse of power, not 
the right. And besides, the people consented to the alienation, either willingly or by 
force.92 
Vattel concluded that—absent “extreme necessity” or “when the public 
safety requires it”93—a country cannot make this decision on behalf of its regions. 
The nation “has not, then, a right to traffic with their rank and liberty, on account 
of any advantages it may expect to derive from such a negotiation.”94 
But even Vattel did not conclude that transfers were forbidden. For Vattel, 
the key was that approval for such transfer must be given by the true “owners” 
of the territory—the people.95 He explained: “[A]s the nation alone has a right to 
subject itself to a foreign power, the right of really alienating the state can never 
belong to the sovereign unless it be expressly given him by the entire body of the 
people.”96 Vattel pointed to the Treaty of Madrid, by which King Francis I agreed 
 
 90.  EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS, OR, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF NATURE, 
APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND SOVEREIGNS, § 25, at 116 (Joseph Chitty 
ed., Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson & Co. 1867) (1758) (“The nation, being the sole mistress of the 
property in her possession, may dispose of it as she thinks proper, and may lawfully alienate or mortgage 
it. This right is a necessary consequence of the full and absolute domain. . . . Those who think otherwise, 
cannot allege any solid reason for their opinion. . . .”).  
 91.  Id. at 388. 
 92.  Id. at 31.  
 93.  Id. at 118. Even in these cases, the “province or town thus abandoned and dismembered from 
the state, is not obliged to receive the new master whom the state attempts to set over it,” id. Though 
“[i]t is true, subjects are seldom able to make resistance on such occasions; and, in general, their wisest 
plan will be to submit to their new master, and endeavor to obtain the best terms they can.” Id. at 119. 
 94.  Id. at 118. 
 95.  Id. at 25 (“The state neither is nor can be a patrimony, since the end of patrimony is the 
advantage of the possessor, whereas the prince is established only for the advantage of the state.”).  
 96.  Id. at 32. See also Stéphane Beaulac, Vattel’s Doctrine on Territory Transfers in International 
Law and the Cession of Louisiana to the United States of America, 63 LA. L. REV. 1327, 1345 (2003) 
(“Vattel is clear that the express and unanimous consent of the individuals living in the part of the territory 
ceded is required because ‘sovereignty’ belongs to the people and is thus unalienable. The only exception 
is in situations of pressing necessity or danger to public safety (such as in the context of wars), which 
validate the cession of territory as between the parties to such treaties. As for the individuals living there, 
they are not bound by even such a necessary transfer unless they consent to it, which may be implied by 
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to cede Burgundy to Emperor Charles V—a cession rejected by the people of 
Burgundy—and faulted the cession for violating domestic legal principles: “[A]s 
the laws in express terms refused the king the power of dismembering the 
kingdom, the concurrence of the nation was necessary for that purpose.”97 
In other words, and absent extraordinary circumstances, the members of the 
transferred region must consent to the transfer, explicitly or otherwise.98 Along 
these lines, and in the context of the post–World War I peace treaties and the 
importance of holding plebiscites regarding the redrawing of a number of 
national boundaries, U.S. President Woodrow Wilson said in 1918: “Peoples . . . 
are not to be bartered about from sovereignty to sovereignty as if they were mere 
chattel and pawns in a game.”99 
Essentially, Vattel anticipated, and Wilson later helped create, what is now 
known as the right of self-determination—the power of a people to decide its own 
national affiliation.100 Although its precise legal status remains unclear,101 the 
general trajectory of self-determination has been from a political principle to a 
right recognized in foundational legal documents such as the UN Charter.102 
To the degree that self-determination operates as either a strict legal 
limitation or, at the least, an aspirational principle,103 it requires nations to 
account for their regions’ preferences.104 As one commentator explains: “In the 
 
their mere silence.”). 
 97.  VATTEL, supra note 90, at 119.  
 98.  Beaulac, supra note 96, at 1354 (concluding that the Louisiana Purchase, “with the perceived 
threat of British invasion of the French colony, makes it possible to argue in favour of the exception 
provided for in cases of extreme necessity or danger to public safety. In this context, the consent 
requirement is relaxed so that the people’s silence can be deemed enough for the necessary approval or 
ratification of a treaty transferring a part of the national territory. This is no doubt what happened in the 
case of Louisiana.”). 
 99.  President Wilson’s Address to Congress, Analyzing German and Austrian Peace Utterances, 
Delivered in Joint Session (Feb. 11, 1918), reprinted in 1 THE MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF WOODROW 
WILSON 472, 478 (Albert Shaw ed. 1924). 
 100.  KORMAN, supra note 83, at 36–37 (tracing the domestic principle to the French Enlightenment, 
and citing Vattel to support the international version). 
 101.  Allen Buchanan, Theories of Secession, 26(1) PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 31, 33 n.2 (1997) (“[T]he 
consensus among legal scholars at this time is that international law does not recognize a right to secede 
in other circumstances, but that it does not unequivocally prohibit it either.”). 
 102.  International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights art. 1, (Dec. 16, 1966), 993 
U.N.T.S. 3; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 1, (Dec. 16, 1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171. 
G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), U.N. Doc. A/Res/1541 (XV) (Dec. 15, 1960) (explaining that self-determination 
could lead to secession and the formation of a new state, association of a territory with an existing state, 
or integration of a territory into an already existing state); Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. at 122 (separate 
opinion of Dillard, J.) (“It is for the people to determine the destiny of the territory.”); SURYA P. 
SHARMA, TERRITORIAL ACQUISITION, DISPUTES, AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 (1997) (“Practice since 
the establishment of the United Nations leaves no doubt that self-determination has been transformed 
into a binding rule of international law (jus cogens).”).  
 103.  KORMAN, supra note 83, at 39–40 (“It was certainly the case, then, that by the nineteenth 
century, there had been a definite and discernible change in the moral tone or atmosphere in which 
international relations were conducted, in consequence of the great political push that had been given by 
the French Revolution to the doctrine of the self-determination of peoples.”). 
 104.  ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL REAPPRAISAL 190 (1995) 
(“In the case of such transfers, the States involved are duty-bound to ascertain the wishes of the 
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end, states may be free to set their borders as they choose, but the norms 
governing territorial sovereignty offer them critical signposts to reach agreement 
on the invisible lines that still define our international order.”105 
Importantly, as a matter of practice, nations do, especially in recent years, 
almost always seek the approval of regions transferred through cession.106 This is 
particularly relevant in the context of former colonies because they might be 
prime candidates for involuntary expulsion and most are determined to remain 
part of the colonizing country.107 Berna Thompson-Murphy, a Cayman Islands 
leader, explained in the course of opposing a visit from the UN Special 
Committee on Decolonisation: 
The UN has a responsibility to investigate whether colonies would want to become 
independent. At one time, this was a useful exercise, as there were some colonies which 
were oppressed by the mother countries; but there are very few, if any, colonies which 
still fall into this category. In the case of Cayman we are fully committed to remaining 
a crown colony. . . . Even the discussion of independence is out of the question. . . .  If 
the foreign press headlines say ‘UN Commission returns from Cayman following 
negotiations for independence’ you can bet we’ll see investors’ money leaving Cayman 
immediately after. We can’t allow them any room to suggest that independence can 
even be discussed.108 
Such opposition has generally been successful, at least in recent years. Aldrich 
and Connell note that “No territory has been thrust into independence against 
its will.”109 Antonio Cassese has an even stronger take: 
  
 
population concerned, by means of a referendum or plebiscite, or by any other appropriate means that 
ensure a free and genuine expression of will.”); id. at 193 (concluding that a transfer without such a 
plebiscite “would be contrary to jus cogens and could therefore be declared null and void”); KORMAN, 
supra note 83, at 37 (“[I]f the principle of self-determination applies, then a victor cannot have a right to 
rule by virtue of conquest, but only by virtue of the people’s consent.”); SHARMA, supra note 102, at 213 
(arguing that, with qualifications, self-determination “is a right under international law and its exercise 
can be fundamental as a modality for the lawful transfer of territorial title”). 
 105.  Ratner, supra note 84, at 829. 
 106.  See OPPENHEIM, supra note 15 (noting that even when territory is obtained through 
prescription, it is sometimes ratified by plebiscite). See also CHRISTOPHER C. JOYNER, INTERNATIONAL 
LAW IN THE 21ST CENTURY: RULES FOR GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 44 (2005) (“The practice of holding 
plebsicites to determine whether a transfer of territory accords with the will of the majority of inhabitants 
would seem desirable as a rule, as in the case of East Timor in 1999.”); KAREN KNOP, DIVERSITY AND 
SELF DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 12–13, 159–178 (2004) (detailing recent instances of 
transfers of sovereign territory, most of which have occurred only after obtaining the approval of the 
local populations); Eyal Benvenisti, The Origins of the Concept of Belligerent Occupation, 26 LAW & 
HIST. REV. 621, 628 (2008) (crediting 18th century French practice for the norm that cessions of territory 
between nations are not valid unless popularly approved); Timothy William Waters, The Blessing of 
Departure: Acceptable and Unacceptable State Support for Demographic Transformation, LAW & ETHICS 
HUM. RTS. 9, 20–21 (2008) (noting that although “there is no actual obligation,” there is “precedent for 
the practice of consulting an affected population”). 
 107.  ALDRICH & CONNELL, supra note 1, at 247 (“Self-determination increasingly favours 
constitutional dependency rather than sovereign independence.”).  
 108.  Id. at 142 (internal citation omitted).  
 109.  Id. at 162. Elsewhere, however, the authors note that “if the inhabitants of several of the small 
former British colonies had been offered a referendum on their future status, and specifically asked if 
they wanted to opt for full British citizenship and integration into the United Kingdom, there is every 
chance they would have voted overwhelmingly to do so.” Id. at 164 (internal quotation marks omitted).  
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Neither State practice nor resolutions adopted by the United Nations or other 
intergovernmental organizations has recently laid special emphasis on the principle that 
in the case of a transfer of territorial sovereignty by one State to another, the wishes of 
the people concerned should always be taken into account. This however does not mean 
that this has been discarded or neglected by States or international organizations. The 
truth of the matter is that the concept was simply regarded as obvious, that is as logically 
following from the whole thrust and basic content of self-determination.110 
The challenge is to reconcile this “basic content” with the longstanding and 
foundational power of cession. Indeed, it has been said that “the defining issue in 
international law for the 21st century is finding compromises between the 
principles of self-determination and the sanctity of borders.”111 
This article does not purport to solve that “defining issue.” Its admittedly 
partial and imperfect solution is to conceptualize both sovereignty and self-
determination in functional terms—as legal fictions designed to further basic 
goals of the international system, including peace, stability, and good governance. 
When a state egregiously undermines those principles, it loses the benefit of the 
legal fiction. One sees this in international legal principles—it may be too much 
yet to call them rules—regarding remedial secession, humanitarian intervention, 
and the responsibility to protect, all of which deny the shield of sovereignty to 
oppressive and unrepresentative governments. 
This suggests that sovereignty and quality of governance are linked—a point 
made at length by those who have argued for recognition of a “fiduciary duty” 
between states and citizens in international law.112 The framework described in 
part IV is based on a similar view, and therefore conditions the power of 
expulsion on the region’s behavior, rather than solely on the nation’s wishes. 
This framework does not incorporate any particular view of governance, but 
rather rests on the notion that good governance is what entitles nations to the 
benefits of sovereignty, and, likewise, that good behavior is what entitles regions 
to stay within a nation even against that nation’s wishes. Where a nation becomes 
oppressive or unrepresentative, it may forfeit its claim to territorial sovereignty—
that is the principle of remedial secession. Where a region engages in equivalent 
behavior, it may forfeit its claim to remain within a sovereign that no longer wants 
it—that is the principle of expulsion. 
  
 
 110.  CASSESE, supra note 104, at 189. 
 111.  Michael P. Scharf, Earned Sovereignty: Juridicial Underpinnings, 31 DENVER J. INT’L L & POL’Y 
373, 373 (2003) (citing Lorie M. Graham, Self-Determination for Indigenous Peoples After Kosovo: 
Translating Self-Determination “Into Practice” and “Into Peace,” 6 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 455,465 
(2000)). See also CASSESE, supra note 104, at 190; Lea Brilmayer, Secession and Self-Determination: A 
Territorial Interpretation, 16 YALE J. INT’L. L. 177 (1991). 
 112.  See, e.g., Evan J. Criddle & Evan Fox-Decent, The Fiduciary Constitution of Human Rights, 15 
LEGAL THEORY 301 (2009).  
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B. Independent Constraints 
Although the preceding discussion indicates that international law does not 
(and should not) preclude expulsion as a general matter, other rules and 
principles impose important and desirable constraints on the terms of 
expulsions.113 
First, expulsion could be disfavored or even ruled out on the basis that it 
conflicts with international law’s norm favoring stable borders. As R.Y. Jennings 
puts it: “[T]he bias of the existing law is towards stability, the status quo, and the 
present effective possession; the tendency of international courts is to let sleeping 
dogs lie. This is right, for the stability of territorial boundaries must always be the 
ultimate aim.”114 Perhaps the most notable instance of this bias is in the doctrine 
of uti possidetis, which freezes the borders of newly independent states based on 
boundaries drawn by their colonial administrators.115 The strength of uti 
possidetis is such that it trumps most other considerations of international law, 
perhaps even including the principle of self-determination.116 Combined with 
related principles in treaty law,117 the result is that “international law is precluded 
from raising legal questions and seeking self-correction with regard to the well-
documented woes of colonialism.”118 
 
 113.  One big exception is worth noting: As a general matter, cessions and other changes in sovereign 
control do not relieve the host nation of its existing obligations under international law—treaty 
obligations involving the people or the territory that has been ceded, for example. The same would of 
course remain true of expulsions, and the usual rules regarding succession and international obligations 
would remain in effect.   
 114.  JENNINGS, supra note 15, at 70; Stuart Elden, Contingent Sovereignty, Territorial Integrity, and 
the Sanctity of Borders, 26(1) SAIS REV. INT’L AFFAIRS 11, 11 (2006) (“Since the end of World War II, 
the international political system has been structured around three central tenets: the notion of equal 
sovereignty of states, internal competence for domestic jurisdiction, and territorial preservation of 
existing boundaries.”); Ratner, supra note 84, at 810 (“Boundaries secured by legal agreement can be 
changed by future agreement, but states and international organizations view revision as an exceptional 
remedy. Contemporary manifestations of this principle include the rule in the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties precluding reliance on rebus sic stantibus to challenge a border treaty, the rule in the 
Vienna Convention on the Succession of States in Respect of Treaties denying that succession has any 
effect on border treaties, and the presumptive inheritance of colonial-era boundaries by new states.”). 
 115.  Frontier Dispute (Burk. Faso v. Republic of Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, para. 20 (Dec. 22) (describing 
uti posseditis as a system in which “administrative boundaries” are “transformed into international 
frontiers in the full sense of the term.”); Elden, supra note 114, at 12 (“This norm calling for the 
perpetuation of the territorial status quo was equally apparent during decolonialization, when states 
inherited the boundaries of colonial divisions under a legal principle known as uti possidetis.”). 
 116.  CASSESE, supra note 104, at 192–93 (“In this area, the principle of self-determination, instead of 
influencing the content of international legal rules, has been ‘trumped’ by other, overriding 
requirements.”); Matthew M. Riccardi, Title to the Aouzou Strip: A Legal and Historical Analysis, 17 
YALE J. INT’L L. 301, 428 (1992) (“In general, uti possidetis has succeeded in Africa against claims based 
on historical, ethnic, geographical, or economic considerations, because the adjustment of boundaries 
based on these other principles threatens to destabilize governments.”).  
 117.  JOSHUA CASTELLINO & STEVE ALLEN, TITLE TO TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: A 
TEMPORAL ANALYSIS 115 (2003) (arguing that the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of 1969 
and the Vienna Convention on the Succession of States in respect of Treaties “amount to an attempt to 
rule out the possibility of principled boundary readjustment in the post-colonial era”).  
 118.  Castellino, supra note 85, at 507. See also CASTELLINO & ALLEN, supra note 117, at 114 
(“[I]nstead of seeking territorial settlement, uti posseditis seeks to ‘settle’ people within fixed territories. 
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Stability, however, is favored for an instrumental reason—on the theory that 
the status quo can help prevent conflict by providing stability.119 And history 
suggests that this supposition has not been borne out. One study found that 
“roughly one-third of the then existing land boundaries were subject to dispute 
at some time” between 1950 and 1990.120 Even scholars who believe that sticky 
borders have reduced the number of border conflicts note that it has contributed 
to internal conflicts.121 Despite—or perhaps because of—the Organization for 
African Unity’s early support for uti possidetis, Africa is full of illustrative 
examples.122 
In other words, the stability norm seems largely to be failing on its own terms, 
and permitting expulsion—with the limitations and standards discussed below—
might facilitate peaceful divorces, and help vindicate the principle of self-
determination.123 Maintaining bad borders can be costly, particularly when 
people and regions are bundled together according to the whims of colonial 
masters, rather than as a function of real commonalities.124 To the degree that uti 
posseditis precludes beneficial border changes, it should—and can—be rejected. 
 
Thus the norm treats the need for territorial ‘order’ as being more important than the ‘identity’ of a 
people.”). 
 119.  Tayyab Mahmud, Colonial Cartographies, Postcolonial Borders, and Enduring Failures of 
International Law: The Unending Wars Along the Afghanistan-Pakistan Frontier, 36 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 
1, 65 (2010) (“The primary rationale for the adoption of the principle [of uti posseditis] has been to avoid 
territorial conflict among post-colonial states, particularly in the light of international law’s primary 
role—preservation of order.”); Jan Paulsson, Boundary Disputes Into the Twenty-First Century: Why, 
How . . . and Who?, 95 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 122, 122 & n.1 (2001) (noting that “[i]nternational law 
has developed a normative framework to support the proposition that stable boundaries mean reduced 
conflict,” and offering as support “the Charter of the United Nations, which recognizes that the 
sovereignty of a state is absolute and exclusive and that states must respect the territorial integrity of one 
another”). 
 120.  Paulsson, supra note 119, at 123 (noting 129 such conflicts) (citing PAUL K. HUTH, STANDING 
YOUR GROUND: TERRITORIAL DISPUTES AND INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT (1996)). See also 
Burghardt, supra note 6, at 226 (“our century has witnessed dozens of conflicting claims on territory and 
transfers of control over territory.”).  
 121.  Aman Mahray McHugh, Comment, Resolving International Boundary Disputes in Africa: A 
Case for the International Court of Justice, 49 HOWARD L.J. 209, 218 & n.73 92005) (arguing uti possiditis 
has led to “a relatively limited number of border disputes within Africa, and almost no border wars” but 
that “Africa has been plagued by internal conflicts, due in part to the arbitrariness of borders as drawn 
up by European colonizers”). 
 122.  Makau Wa Mutua, Why Redraw the Map of Africa: A Moral and Legal Inquiry, 16 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 1113 (1995).  
 123.  SHARMA, supra note 102, at 334 (“The additional difficulty is that uti possidetis juris reflects the 
prescription of territorial integrity based on the policy of stability of frontiers, and as such it conflicts with 
another principle, namely, the rights of peoples to self-determination, which is based on the policy of 
change.”); see also Case Concerning the Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Mali), 1986 I.C.J. 554, 567 
(Dec. 22) (privileging uti possidetis over self-determination). 
 124.  JOHN AGNEW, GEOPOLITICS: RE-VISIONING WORLD POLITICS 102 (1998) (arguing that 
colonialism resulted in “lines on a map which had little relation to underlying cultural or economic 
patterns. . . . These designations continue to haunt these regions to this day.”); CASTELLINO & ALLEN, 
supra note 117, at 7 (“Post-decolonization, these artificially created entities have been exhorted, in the 
name of coherent ‘national identity,’ to create for themselves national myths and legends . . . [h]owever, 
in many instances these myths and legends have not proved adequate in peacefully sustaining the post-
colonial state.”) 
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Second, international law generally prohibits “mass expulsion,” defined as 
“an act or behavior by which a State compels a group of aliens to leave its 
territory.”125 This is not a blanket prohibition. It holds that the power of mass 
expulsion can only “be exercised in conformity with the principles of good faith, 
proportionality, and justifiability, with due regard to the basic human rights of 
the individual concerned.”126 And the prohibition on mass expulsion does not 
squarely apply to the scenarios described here, because the contemplated 
expulsions do not involve forcing anyone to physically move. Expulsion, in the 
proffered framework, moves borders, not people. People can stay in their homes 
and communities, avoiding many of the harms that the prohibition on mass 
expulsion was meant to address. 
Relatedly, international law disfavors the creation of stateless peoples—those 
with no citizenship in any state recognized by the existing community of 
nations.127 To the degree that an expulsion strips people of citizenship, it could 
violate this rule. Consider, for example, the Nationality Act of 1981, passed by 
the Thatcher government, which stripped the right of U.K. citizenship from 
residents of the British “overseas territories.”128 
There are at least three ways to prevent the statelessness problem posed by 
this scenario. One is for the region to become part of another country, and its 
people to obtain new citizenship. Another is for the expelled region to be 
welcomed into the international community as a new state,129 a prospect that 
would be facilitated if the expelling nation were to recognize it as such.130 But it 
is not enough to count on this uncertain recognition. A stronger, and preferable, 
remedy would provide that the residents of the expelled territory retain their 
citizenship in the parent nation until such time as they can acquire alternative 
 
 125.  Maurice Kamto, Third Report on the Expulsion of Aliens (19 Apr. 2007, A/CN.4/581), at 132. 
 126.  JULIA WOJNOWSKA-RADZINSKA, THE RIGHT OF AN ALIEN TO BE PROTECTED AGAINST 
ARBITRARY EXPULSION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 17 (2015) (“The power of expulsion must be 
exercised in conformity with the principles of good faith, proportionality and justifiability, with due 
regard to the basic human rights of the individual concerned.”) (quoting report of the International Law 
Association); see also Andric v. Sweden, App. No. 45917/99, 28 Eur. H.R. Rep. CD218, CD218-20 (1999) 
(“[C]ollective expulsion is to be understood as any measure compelling aliens, as a group, to leave a 
country, except where such a measure is taken on the basis of a reasonable and objective examination of 
the particular case of each individual alien of the group.”). 
 127.  See, e.g., The Concept of Stateless Persons under International Law, Expert Meeting Organized 
by the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Prato, Italy, 27–28 May 2010, 
http://www.unhcr.org/4cb2fe326.html [https://perma.cc/4EVA-A5H4]. 
 128.  Citizens of the former colonies, the members of the Commonwealth such as Pakistan and India, 
had been stripped of their rights to even visit the United Kingdom well before this—the underlying fear 
being that British culture would be overwhelmed.  In 1981, the underlying concern in the United 
Kingdom appears to have been the fear of immigration from Hong Kong, in the wake of the upcoming 
Chinese takeover. See, e.g., AVTAR BRAH, CARTOGRAPHIES OF DIASPORA: CONTESTING IDENTITIES, 
37–41 (1996); Anthony Browne, Banished Islanders are British Again, OBSERVER, May 11, 2002. 
 129.  Christian Hillgruber, The Admission of New States to the International Community, 9(3) EUR. J. 
INT’L L. 491 (1998). Writing in 1963, Jennings noted that the emergence of the new states was “by far the 
most important case of territorial change at the present time” and yet “international law [on this topic] 
is singularly undeveloped, uncertain, and . . . comparatively unstudied.”  
 130.  JENNINGS, supra note 15, at 504–05.  
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citizenship, either in their own nation or another. This would effectively mean 
that they would be expatriates, at least for a time. Similar rules often apply in the 
case of cessions wherein the nations involved in the cession typically make some 
provision for the citizenship of the people living in the ceded territory.131 
An objection here is that it might be hard to force the nations doing the 
expelling to provide citizenship. Or, more realistically, other nations might not 
wish to exert the effort to police the remedies. One way out of this is for the 
region that was expelled to have a damages claim against the remainder of the 
nation that expelled it. That claim would come into play as a remedy for the 
failure to grant citizenship. If some other country were to “adopt” the expelled 
region, it might even take over the claim and pursue it against the originally 
expelling country.132 
Although this article does not pursue the question in any detail, it might make 
sense to create two separate sets of rules governing expulsion from nations: One 
for scenarios in which a region is transferred into another country (the traditional 
cession) and another for those in which the region is left on its own (the forced 
secession). In the former case, statelessness is not an issue, though the citizens of 
the region should still be given an option of retaining their former citizenship. In 
the latter case, the issue of statelessness is a live question. 
Third, international law likely prohibits nations from ceding territory when 
doing so would put the residents of that territory in danger of oppression and 
violence. The framework incorporates this rule as well. Expulsion, no less than 
cession, should be forbidden where it would put the residents of the ceded or 
expelled territory into harm’s way. To cede a region to a foreign country knowing 
that its people would face oppression—giving a religiously homogenous region 
over to a country known for persecuting that religion—would be little better than 
inflicting the oppression directly. 
Generally speaking, these rules reflect an ambivalence in international law: 
the law places some limits on the power of nations to fit people to borders, but 
almost none on the power of nations to fit borders to people. This is perhaps 
understandable, because, historically speaking, nations have tended to resolve 
tensions between people and borders by moving the former, sometimes with 
horrific force. For the foregoing reasons, we think that some of the same legal 
restrictions should apply to shifting borders as well. 
* * * 
  
 
 131.  Christina Duffy Burnett notes that Carman Randolph, in his analysis of the Insular Cases, had 
concluded that Justice White’s concurring opinion had discussed “the question of sale from the premise 
that selling United States territory means selling citizens.” Randolph, however, insisted that selling land 
is not the same as selling the people living on it. Carman F. Randolph, The Insular Cases, 1 COLUM. L. 
REV. 436, 460–61 (1901) (cited in Burnett, supra note 5, at 864). 
 132.  We describe a conceptually similar damages claim in Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, Competing 
for Refugees: A Market-Based Solution to a Humanitarian Crisis, 48 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 59 
(2016). 
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Having tilted at a succession of giants, one must consider the possibility that 
they were windmills all along. Perhaps there is simply no point in discussing 
expulsion, particularly in the situations here envisioned—oppression, extreme 
misbehavior, and the like—as if they presented legal questions.133 As with 
questions of secession or revolution, the only answers might be political.134 
In fact, the proposed framework is better insulated against this charge than 
many other projects in international law. To a greater degree than, for example, 
some approaches to international human rights, the framework not only accounts 
for, but actually depends on, nations acting out of self-interest. In areas of 
international law where the rules are seen as contributing to nations’ overall self-
interest—for example, the obligation to repay foreign debt—compliance with 
directives tends to be much stronger. 
Even if it is true that the expulsion can only be evaluated in extra-legal terms, 
the basic framework would not change much. The framework would be better 
understood as a description of best practices, rather than legal rules, but the basic 
principles would be the same. What, then, are those principles? 
IV 
TOWARDS A FRAMEWORK 
This final part attempts to set out a framework with which to evaluate the 
legitimacy of expulsion. Its suggestions are tentative and general—every nation 
and supranational organization is unique in its legal arrangements, history, and 
political incentives. Nevertheless, some tentative observations are possible. 
Consider some general propositions derived from the preceding discussion: 
• There are scenarios in which a flat rule against expulsion—whether 
from nations or supranational organizations—is undesirable. 
• At the same time, expulsion is a powerful tool that could be misused. 
It should be subject to limitations. 
• Where nations have provided for their own explicit rules regarding 
expulsion, those should generally be followed. 
• The question of expulsion is not solely one of politics; law matters. 
• Under traditional rules of international law, nations can cede territory 
as they wish, thereby giving them the power to expel their own 
regions. 
 
 133.  Weiler, supra note 11, at 2412 (“It takes no particular insight to suggest that should a Member 
State consider withdrawing from the [European Coal and Steel] Community, the legal argument will not 
be the critical or determining consideration.”). 
 134.  Chi Carmody, On Expelling Nigeria from the Commonwealth, 34 CANADIAN Y.B. INT’L L. 273, 
285 (1996) (“[E]xtra-legal considerations play a large role in decisions to expel.”); Sohn, supra note 75, 
at 1424 (“Expulsion seems to be more a weapon of the politician than the statesman.”); see also 
KONSTANTINOS D. MAGLIVERAS, EXCLUSION FROM PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL 
ORGANISATIONS 65 (1999) (“[S]tates would not be prepared to adopt exclusion clauses but would 
seriously attempt to persuade other Members to adopt constitutional acts aiming to bring about results 
similar to expulsion. These acts, from a legal, as opposed to political, perspective, usually lack the 
required justification.”). 
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• This unchecked power to cede territory is inconsistent with the 
principle of self-determination. 
• While international law permits expulsion, it generally does not 
permit statelessness or stripping citizenship. If territory is expelled, 
the people who live there must have the option to retain their 
citizenship.135 
Based on these propositions and the analysis in the preceding sections, three 
categories of expulsion emerge, each with its own rules, and each separated from 
the others based on the governance and degree of “fault” in the region being 
expelled. 
A. Scenario 1: Well-Behaved Regions Cannot Be Involuntarily Expelled 
Begin with a strong default rule: So long as a region is honoring its basic 
responsibilities to the nation, it cannot be expelled against its will. 
This would represent a greater restriction against expulsion than 
international law currently seems to provide. International law apparently 
imposes no prima facie limitations on the power of states to cede regions,136 even 
in the absence of regional approval. But that rule cannot be reconciled with the 
principle of self-determination, nor is it desirable on its own terms. If it were 
accepted, then nations could jettison former colonies or cast off poor regions with 
impunity, violating the implicit bargains that hold nations together, threatening 
the welfare of the people living in those regions, and maybe even destabilizing 
the international order. And as a legal matter, the principle of self-
determination—especially when combined with related rules regarding 
statelessness and citizenship, and also with the current practice of seeking 
regional approval for cessions—provides strong support for the view that 
international law no longer tolerates cession (that is, expulsion) purely at the 
option of the rump state. 
If a nation wanted to expel a well-behaved but undesirable region, it would 
have to do so by negotiating directly with the region itself. The way to 
demonstrate this approval would probably be through a plebiscite—the usual 
  
  
 
 135.  In this respect, we may be imposing an additional requirement beyond what international law 
already requires. JOYNER, supra note 106, at 44 (“When territory is ceded by one state to another, the 
ceding state has the power to transfer the allegiance of the inhabitants, and the acquiring state is obligated 
to confer nationality on those persons, though it is not necessarily required to give them political rights 
as citizens.”). Doing so may make political sense, in any event. Cf. ALDRICH & CONNELL, supra note 1, 
at 232 (“Macao’s population has been less reluctant about the return of the city to China because . . . 
Lisbon extended rights of citizenship to many Macanese who might wish to settle in Portugal.”).  
 136.  As noted above, such expulsions would have to respect a variety of side constraints, but the 
expulsion itself is not forbidden.  
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means of effectuating self-determination interests.137 The United Nations might 
play a role in organizing and conducting such plebiscites, as it has done in the 
past.138 
The region could hold out, of course—its right to remain in the nation would 
be protected by a “property right” in the Calabresi/Melamed sense139—but a deal 
might be reached in some cases. Perhaps the United States could cover Puerto 
Rico’s debts and guarantee its people the option of continuing U.S. citizenship, 
in return for “granting” the island independence. Some elite European 
intellectuals want the European Monetary Union to offer the same basic deal to 
Greece.140 Such agreements would have to be monitored for fraud, threats of 
force, and the like, the existence of which would—in keeping with basic principles 
of existing treaty law—void the relevant agreement.141 But in general, if a region 
or member state is not at fault for the deteriorating relationship, then it cannot 
be expelled against its will. This means, for example, that a nation could not expel 
a region simply because it is poor or because its people are of a different ethnicity 
from those running the government of the rump state. 
B. Scenario 2: Malefactor Regions Can Be Remedially Expelled 
On the opposite end of the spectrum are scenarios in which a region is 
disregarding its basic obligations to the nation and is inflicting serious harms on 
it while refusing to leave. In this narrow set of cases, the nation should have the 
option of “remedial expulsion.” This argument has obvious symmetry with 
remedial secession, which might not (yet) be an enforceable principle of 
international law. But its ascending influence is undeniable, and it meshes well 
with the general principle of self-determination. 
It is tempting, in fact, to simply treat expulsion as a special category of 
secession (a “majority secession,” perhaps) and subject to the same strict 
conditions and prohibitions. The two scenarios are very much analogous, but not 
identical. The general prohibition on secession is a function of the national right 
to territorial integrity—a prerogative of the national government—and that right 
simply is not at issue when the “nation” itself is the one severing ties. If Spain 
were to try to expel Catalonia, for example, that decision would be made through 
 
 137.  JENNINGS, supra note 15, at 78 (“Self-determination is frequently coupled with the technique of 
plebiscite to give it practical realization; though it is clearly a technique suited only to particular kinds of 
situations, needs careful international control if it is not to be abused, and usually depends in any case 
upon the initial agreements of the parties concerned.”).  
 138.  Id. at 78–79 & n.1 (“It seems likely that the plebiscite still has a part to play in certain kinds of 
situation for resolving the question of the proper destination of certain kinds of territory; and indeed the 
United Nations has already organized plebiscites on a number of occasions.”); id. (listing, inter alia, 
plebiscites in Togo, the British Cameroons, West Samoa, French Togo-land, and Belgian Ruanda-
Urundi).  
 139.  Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One 
View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
 140.  See sources cited supra note 10. 
 141.  Lowell B. Bautista, The Historical Context and Legal Basis of the Philippine Treaty Limits, 10 
ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 1, 11 (2008). 
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the regular mechanisms of the recognized Spanish government, and so could not 
be said to threaten the government’s own interests. If Catalonia were to secede, 
that decision would be made by the Catalans, who are not currently a sovereign 
nation. The former scenario—the one that interests us—employs existing 
governmental machinery. This is why territorial integrity (a prerogative of the 
sovereign) is not undermined by cession, but only by secession. 
Even so, the logic underlying the right to remedial secession might apply in 
both cases. In the standard version—a minority attempting to engage in remedial 
secession—the threshold of mistreatment is high.142 In practice, it seems that a 
region must suffer serious human rights violations before it has a legal right to 
leave or for the international community to intervene. 
What is good for the regional goose should be good for the national gander. 
Where a region imposes the same kind of human rights violations on the rest of 
the nation that would, if imposed in the opposite direction, justify its remedial 
secession, then there is no clear reason why the nation should not have the same 
option. “Remedial secession” of the majority—or a forced remedial secession of 
the region, amounting to nearly the same thing—would simply vindicate the same 
underlying principle. Even Vattel would permit expulsion in cases of “extreme 
necessity” or “when the public safety requires it.”143 
Such scenarios will be rare. If a particular region or majority were able to 
establish dominance within government, then the analysis here would not even 
apply. The government would be the malefactor, and the usual rules of remedial 
secession would be in effect. And typically, nations have sufficient means to 
protect themselves against their regions using the basic tools of sovereign power, 
including force. These, after all, are essentially the elements of “voice” vis-à-vis 
regions. But, from the perspective of nearly any important value—general 
welfare, democracy, humanitarian considerations—why should nations be 
encouraged to employ those tools rather than simply engaging in a clean break? 
The analogy between secession and expulsion is not perfect. Either route 
terminates the union, but not necessarily in identical fashion: compare a spouse 
who walks out of the home to one who is kicked out. In either case, the 
relationship may be terminated, but the collateral consequences are different. 
The primary reason to see expulsion as having different implications than exit is 
that the party doing the expelling is the rump state—it gets to choose to keep all 
the benefits that come from the apparatus of statehood. These benefits include 
things like membership in international organizations, name, flag, currency, 
reputation as a long-time dependable contracting party, and so on.144 Because the 
 
 142.  Reference re Secession of Québec, 37 I.L.M. 1340, 1371 (1998) (“A right to external self-
determination (which in this case potentially takes the form of the assertion of a right to unilateral 
secession) arises in only the most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defined 
circumstances.”); William W. Burke-White, Crimea and the International Legal Order (Penn Law: Public 
Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 14-24, 2014) http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2474084 [https://perma.cc/8C7G-H5MC].  
 143.  VATTEL, supra note 90, at 118. 
 144.  Whether they would be able to continue as members of the EU, even after secession, was a 
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value of these collateral benefits to the rump state might be quite high, it makes 
sense to set the standard for expulsion higher than that for exit. 
One might worry about a nation using invented violations as a pretext for 
expelling regions they do not want, or blackmailing them by threatening to do 
so.145 But the alternative is not necessarily much better—trapping a nation and a 
region in an unhappy marriage might be the worst solution of all.146 The nation 
can simply act as if the region has been expelled, neglecting to meet the basic 
needs of the region’s people.147 Principles of sovereign integrity will largely shield 
this mistreatment from international intervention. Indeed, expulsion might be 
preferred precisely because it is more transparent and public, just as withdrawal 
from a treaty can be preferable to nonperformance.148 If the nation inflicts 
oppression and basic human rights violations on the unwanted region, then the 
region might be able to invoke its right to remedial secession. But that would 
simply mean achieving the same result as expulsion, albeit by a more circuitous 
and painful route. 
The goal here is to describe a general proposition, not to nail down all of the 
details, but we are not unmindful of the latter’s importance or difficulty. Of 
course, identifying what it means for a region to respect its basic obligations to 
the country is difficult and contestable, and might vary from country to country. 
Though this article does not attempt to flesh out the rule with any precision, the 
difficulty of doing so is not an insuperable obstacle. After all, international law 
generally provides for withdrawal from treaties in case of material breach,149 and 
arguably provides for expulsion by that same standard.150 The framework 
therefore embraces essentially the equivalent of a material breach standard in 
the national context. 
In exercising the power of remedial expulsion, nations and organizations 
should presumably be subject to a requirement of good faith,151 which would also 
 
particular sticking point in the recently contemplated secessions of Scotland and Catalonia.  
 145.  Helfer, supra note 68, at 1591 (“The existence of this insurance policy enables states to negotiate 
more expansive or deeper substantive treaty commitments ex ante, although it also raises troubling 
opportunities for strategic action ex post.”); Anna T. Katselas, Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Investment 
Treaty Arbitration, 93 NEB. L. REV. 313, 361 (2014) (noting that “states sometimes use exit, or threats 
thereof, as a strategy to increase their voice in international organizations”). 
 146.  Cf. JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, NO EXIT AND THREE OTHER PLAYS 47 (L. Abel trans., Vintage 
Books ed., 1955) (“There’s no need for red hot pokers. Hell is—other people!”). 
 147.  This problem could be mitigated if international law were to more clearly recognize a fiduciary 
duty between nations and their citizens.  
 148.  Helfer, supra note 68, at 1587 (“Particularly given the international legal system’s relatively 
anarchic environment, in which surreptitious shirking of treaty obligations is often plausible, a state’s 
decision to follow the rules of the game, publicize a future withdrawal, and open itself to scrutiny 
demonstrates a kind of respect for international law.”).  
 149.  See generally id. 
 150.  See Blocher, Gulati & Helfer, supra note 8. 
 151.  Vienna Convention, art. 26 (“Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be 
performed by them in good faith.”); Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), Judgment, 1997 
I.C.J. 7, para. 142 (Sept. 25) (noting that this provision “obliges the Parties to apply [the treaty] in a 
reasonable way and in such a manner that its purpose can be realized”). 
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need to be elaborated. A forum would have to be established, and the judges 
there would have to be able to identify the relevant sets of facts.152 But these are 
precisely the kinds of problems that confront the principle of remedial secession, 
and it has grown in strength despite them. 
C. Scenario 3: Underperforming Regions Might Be Subject To a Forced Buyout 
In cases of remedial expulsion, the region or member state is at serious fault—
its own egregious misbehavior is the very thing that justifies its expulsion. But 
what about the middle set of cases in which a region or member state is seriously 
misbehaving (but not to the degree of oppression previously discussed), imposing 
costs (financial and otherwise) on the rest of the nation, but not outright 
oppressing it? Or what if the union is dysfunctional, but the region is not so 
clearly at fault? 
One response would be to include these scenarios in our broad default rule 
against involuntary expulsion of well-behaved regions and members. After all, if 
it were too easy for a nation to shed its poor regions, then expulsion might be 
overused in all the harmful ways discussed above.153 To take an obvious example, 
nations might start shedding their former colonies, having pillaged them of their 
natural resources, on the theory that they are “seriously underperforming.” 
But it is still worth considering the possibility of expulsion in situations short 
of the horrific malefactor regions above. After all, forbidding expulsion—of a 
former colony, a poor member state, or anyone else—does not mean that the 
situation will necessarily be resolved peacefully within the existing union. In 
Hirschman’s terms, eliminating the exit option should increase voice, but that 
does not mean that it will. 
A nation that is forbidden from expelling a region does not, on the current 
dominant understanding of international law, have a fiduciary duty to provide for 
that region—it can neglect it; even actively harm it. So long as it doesn’t go too 
far, such actions would essentially be shielded from the world by the cloak of 
territorial integrity. This is a bad scenario for all involved; and especially for the 
region. Why have the parent nation go through the inevitably expensive process 
of discriminating against, disadvantaging, and generally oppressing the people of 
the region and then effectively forcing them to seek independence (that is then 
granted benevolently). Why not permit the nation to make the severance official, 
and pay for the severance? 
Put another way, there is no easy way to force nations to treat their regions 
well—no way to ensure specific performance of the social contract, as it were. If 
they want to be rid of a region, facilitating a way for them to do so cleanly through 
expulsion, rather than through messy internal oppression, may be better overall. 
  
 
 152.  MAGLIVERAS, supra note 134, at 2 (suggesting ICJ in the context of the UN, noting that “the 
majority of organizations lack juridical mechanisms for settling such disputes in an authoritative, final, 
and binding manner”). 
 153.  See supra part II.C. 
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One way to do that would be to permit expulsion in such situations, but at a 
cost. The nation or supranational organization wishing to expel the region or 
member state would not only have to show that it was underperforming in some 
serious way, but would also have to compensate it for the expulsion. Something 
similar has been contemplated at the individual level, inasmuch as reparation 
may be required for expulsion of particular individuals.154 With regard to the 
regional expulsions we describe, it may make sense to establish something like a 
standing trust fund, so that regions would not have to wait too long for 
compensation. 
Take the scenario of some former island colony that is located at a great 
distance from the motherland. Say also that this colony, while providing great 
revenues at some point in distant history (the original reason for colonizing it), is 
now a source of big expense to a former imperial power (whose wealth and power 
has diminished, albeit with significantly better conditions than those in the 
colony). Let us also say here that there is a vociferous independence movement 
on the island, whose primary complaint is the systematic discrimination that its 
people have faced over the years from the mainland. And, as a result of the 
numerous protests (and occasional violence), the mainland is having to expend 
large amounts of resources on significant police presence on the island (in 
addition to providing benefits for the large unemployed population). In such a 
scenario, should the former imperial power be able to shed the colony; give it the 
“independence” that is being sought by some of its population? The case is not 
so easy—particularly if the reason for the independence movement is 
mistreatment. 
V 
CONCLUSION 
What are the conditions under which a state can expel one of its own regions? 
There are surely some sets of conditions under which the relationship has become 
so costly and so toxic that the parties should be able to walk away. However, exit 
should not always be as free as it is in the current system. In most cases, the party 
that wishes to exit because it perceives better options should have to compensate 
its erstwhile partner for the damages it has sustained from having the relationship 
broken. 
 
 
 154.  H. LAUTERPACHT, THE FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 286 (1966) 
(“[T]he view that the undoubted right of expulsion degenerates into an abuse of rights whenever an alien 
who has been allowed to take up residence in the country, and to establish his business and set up a home 
is expelled without just reason, and that such an abuse of rights constitutes a wrong involving the duty of 
reparation.”) (emphasis added); WOJNOWSKA-RADZINSKA, supra note 126, at 190 (“State responsibility 
for an internationally wrongful act, the wrongful act, the arbitrary expulsion of an alien, entails 
reparation, namely the obligation to redress the damage.”); id. at 192 (noting that the Human Rights 
Committee has specified money damages as generally being the appropriate remedy). 
